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Abstract – Secure group communications are more prone to 
attacks as compared to the conventional one to one 
communication. Every client in a group can be seen as a single 
source of attack, therefore it is important to design a robust 
security scheme that will protect all the individual clients and 
hence the entire group. In this paper a novel security architecture 
has been presented, that provides a secure group key generation 
and transfer protocol that is based on ICMetrics. The salient 
features of the protocol include a single collaborative key 
generation scheme that is initiated through client authentication. 
Also provided is a rekeying procedure that is important in 
maintaining the freshness of the key and offers perfect forward 
secrecy. The above features are based on the use of ICMetrics to 
provide a security protocol that is scalable and secure. The 
presented protocol has been simulated for varying group 
population sizes using C++ and Maple. The resulting running 
times for various stages of the protocol have been studied. 
Keywords – ICMetrics; group secure communications; key 
generation; group key; group security. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Group based security is an aggravation of one to one 
security. Security provision is a delicate matter, as 
overprovisioning can cause an increase in the amount of 
resources required and ultimately in the inefficiency of the 
entire operation. When studying group based security 
algorithmic efficiency is important, as we are concerned with 
a large client population, therefore a slight decrease in the 
efficiency of the system will result in poor system 
security/performance. The importance of having secure group 
communications is more important because there are many 
clients involved and every client can be considered a single 
point of failure. Hence having a larger number of clients 
implies having more weak points in the group. 
The complexity in group security exists, because group 
security requires specialised procedures for key generation, 
transportation and key administration among other prominent 
activities. Client to client communication is generally based on 
only two clients, i.e. a sender and a receiver [1]. However, 
group communications can be composed of a mesh based 
architecture, master client architecture or a self-organizing 
mesh network. In any case the complexity involved is evident 
due to the high number of entities involved. 
A novel technique for enforcing security is underway that 
promises an effective and ingenious solution to our current 
security related problems. The technique is called Integrated 
Circuit Metrics (ICMetrics) and provides security by using 
individual features or characteristics of a device [2]. 
Conventionally, a user is required to generate a key pair, 
which can involve the use of prime numbers and random 
numbers along with mathematical functions. The same key 
generation is achieved by using ICMetrics and it allows the 
generation of a unique number that is based on the 
characteristics of the device. The characteristics of a device 
can include things like identification numbers, addresses, PC 
counter data and other device related data. Research is 
underway that allows a device to generate a unique, yet stable 
number that can be used for further generation of a key. This 
number is known as the ICMetric and is further used in 
combination with complex algorithms and techniques to 
provide a comprehensive security solution. This technique is 
not an alternative way of producing a random number; 
because the number being produced is generated from 
hardware and software based feature extraction at real time, 
hence no ICMetrics related data needs to be stored on the 
system. The only way of extracting the ICMetrics data is to 
tamper with the constituent hardware unit, which will result in 
the failure of the device. 
Much research [2][3][4] is underway in designing and 
extending ICMetrics, so that it can be fully implemented. 
Researchers are already beginning to acknowledge the added 
benefits ICMetrics has to offer as compared to conventional 
security. Perhaps the greatest advantage of using ICMetrics, is 
that an attempt to extract the ICMetric data will fail, as the 
hardware that generates ICMetrics can be designed to be 
tamper resistant [5]. 
To this end, we propose a multicast security protocol that 
provides a key generation, key transfer and rekeying 
procedure. We then explore the usefulness of the protocol by 
simulating its operations for varying sized client populations. 
This paper begins by first discussing contributions that 
have already been made to the field of group communications. 
Then, two prominent keying perspectives have been presented, 
that explain the various aspects of keying in a group setting. 
Section IV provides a detailed description of the protocol and 
how it operates. Also provided in section IV are details 
relating to the rekeying protocol. In section V we provide a 
standalone and a comparative analysis of the protocol with 
other rivalling protocols. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Perhaps the most prominent and widely acknowledged 
work in the domain of key generation and exchange has been 
done by Diffie and Hellman [6]. They effectively proposed a 
key exchange protocol that allows two parties to exchange 
data and in result exchange keys without transmitting the keys 
over the medium. The problem with the Diffie Hellman key 
exchange is not only it being prone to attacks (bucket brigade 
attack), it is also designed for key exchange between no more 
than two parties. 
To resolve these issues many researchers have strived to 
fine tune the Diffie Hellman Key exchange and also extend 
the protocol so that it can be operated in a group setting [7][8]. 
Many protocols require the services of a Key Distribution 
Centre (KDC) and a Key Generation Centre (KGC) for 
handling rogue entities and also assist in managing entities 
that join or leave the group at any moment. Most modern 
protocols acknowledge that group based security should use 
the services of an administrative body like the KDC and KGC. 
When we view the individual activities of a group performing 
communications, we see that member admittance, member 
removal, key renewal and key distribution are some of the 
major operations that will take place in the group.  
Once the above stated procedures are functional, the 
individual keys need to be managed in relation with their 
owners. This in itself is a complex procedure, because no 
matter what data structure is used, the size of a group and the 
dynamics of the environment cannot be predicted in advance. 
Therefore, researchers have worked on a tree based structure 
[9][10] to store keys in an efficient manner, so that when 
members join or leave the group the key management activity 
can be performed both efficiently and accurately. Researchers 
have successfully attempted to refine and make efficient these 
tree based data structures. 
Papoutsis [17] in his work has performed an investigation 
into the potential of generating encryption keys using 
ICMetrics. The research provides methods and experiments 
that explain the process of generation of the ICMetric number. 
Tahir et al have proposed a secure key generation protocol 
that is based on the use of ICMetrics. They have designed a 
strong key pair key generation scheme that uses SHA-2 and 
session token to generate a public-private key pair that is used 
in one to one secure communications. 
Individual and dispersed work has been done in the 
individual areas relating to multicast security. Based on the 
expected advantages of ICMetrics, it is important to consider 
the use of ICMetrics in multicast security. 
III. KEYING PERSPECTIVES 
Key generation in a group protocol is a unique affair as 
group communication can require the use of group keys and 
individual keys. The ease of using group keys is, that a single 
key can be generated that will govern communications 
between the entire group. Of course if the key is leaked, then 
the entire operation becomes insecure. Researchers [11][12] 
emphasize on the use of contributory keys, as they believe that 
it provides more randomness, key freshness and also ensures 
that once a person leaves or joins, a new key is produced, 
owing to which a guarantee of perfect forward secrecy can be 
given. Key agreement is generally of two types, namely initial 
key agreement and auxiliary key agreement. For a group 
security protocol to be fully operational it must possess both 
the initial and auxiliary protocols. 
A. Initial Agreement Protocol 
The initial key agreement protocol is the most important 
key agreement protocol because this is used when a new client 
attempts to join the group. This protocol needs to be efficient, 
as many clients may be attempting to join a group 
communication at a single time. At the time of group 
conception, a large number of clients may be joining the group 
in parallel, hence streamlined performance of this protocol is 
essential. During the initial key agreement it is important to 
also authenticate the incoming client and also obtain relevant 
data for generation of the contributory key. These individual 
events, although seemingly simple are complex and hence 
require guaranteed efficiency. 
B. Auxiliary Protocol 
The auxiliary key agreement is a secondary protocol that 
will come in effect when a rekeying procedure may be needed. 
This protocol is utilized when client(s) leave the group 
communication or a simple rekey is required. Since group 
communications are dynamic in nature, the services of the 
auxiliary protocol are required when there is a membership 
change in the group. In the absence of the auxiliary protocol, 
there is no defined mechanism for the provision of perfect 
forward secrecy. Hence, even if a client leaves the group he 
will still have access to the current key as his departure did not 
trigger a rekeying process. This implies that the auxiliary 
protocol is required to overwrite the previous keys that are 
prescribed by the group controller. 
IV. PROPOSED WORK 
Before formally introducing the proposed protocol, the 
target security goals have to be understood. These goals, if 
fully addressed, can provide a comprehensive protocol that 
can be easily adopted. 
• The protocol should be based on the use of ICMetrics for 
the generation of ICMetric Keys. 
• The keys should be updated frequently to ensure group 
secrecy. 
• Perfect Forward Secrecy – Whenever a client leaves a 
group, it should not have access to future keys and 
communications taking place in the group [13]. 
• Backward Secrecy - Whenever a new client is admitted to 
a group, it should not have access to previous keys and 
communications taking place in the group [14]. 
• If any data required for key generation is sent 
unencrypted, then it should not become a threat, if the 
data is captured by an adversary, i.e. the attacker should 
not be able to bring down the entire system just because 
he could access a part of the data. 
• The group key protocol should allow clients to join or 
leave a group at any time. 
• The group key protocol should be scalable, i.e. it should 
be computationally feasible if the size of the group 
increases. 
• The protocol should protect from current clients that have 
become rogue. 
• The protocol should easily interoperate with existing 
technologies and protocols. 
A. User Registration 
The protocol is initiated, when a user wishes to get 
registered for group communication. Each client, when it is 
about to get registered, is in fact a single entity upon which the 
conventional rules of client to client communication apply. 
Once the client is admitted into the group only, then it can 
enjoy the benefits of the group communications. A vital 
question which is often not asked is which clients are going to 
be participating in the group communication. The first client 
to initiate a group will host the group communication and will 
“name” those members that will be involved in the group 
communication. This first member of the group will place the 
public keys with the group controller of those clients that will 
be part of the group. This means, when a client intends to join 
the group the group controller can generate a Turing test 
encrypted with the clients public key and will expect a correct 
response, if the client is genuine and has the right private key 
for decryption. So if an incorrect response is obtained for the 
extracted Turing test then it means that the entity is either not 
human or an attacker. Hence bot based attacks can be reduced 
at source. 
For the purpose of enhanced security, the group controller 
will periodically perform the above test on all clients that are 
part of the group communication. This will ensure that any 
client that has abruptly disconnected, is kicked out of the 
communication and any client that can pose to be some other 
entity is automatically filtered out.  
B. Key Generation 
The key generation protocol is a 9 step protocol, which 
consists of producing a group communication key by 
exchanging data between the individual group members and 
the group controller. The important fact here is, that through 
the use of this protocol the generated key is a contributive key, 
which is generated through individual contributions by the 
clients. The clients cannot contact each other for generating 
the key. The individual clients generate their individual data 
and transmit to the group controller. Given below are the steps 
that will be performed by the individual clients: 
Consider  registered members in a group communication 
system  
Step 1: Each member  for  generates its own 
ICMetric number . 
Step 2: Every  computes an , by taking the XOR of  
with a generated random number , i.e. 
,   (1) 
Step 3: With the Group Controller’s public key  each  
encrypts , which also serves the purpose of authentication of 
group controller, 
,   (2) 
Once this step is completed  is sent to the group controller 
for further computation and generation of the group key. 
Hence the following steps (4-9) will be performed by the 
group controller. 
Step 4: The Group Controller (GC) will decrypt each  with 
its own private key  
,   (3) 
Step 5: GC selects an arbitrary number  where 
, i.e. 
  (4) 
Step 6: Now GC generates the Message  
  (5) 
Step 7: GC encrypts  with every member’s public key 
 and sends the encrypted message  individually to all 
members  
,     (6) 
Step 8: Each  decrypts the received  with its own private 
key  
   (7) 
Step 9: Now every group member  derives the key  at its 
own end, i.e. 
,     (8) 
Upon derivation every group member will be equipped 
with a symmetric group communication key that will be used 
to communicate within the group. Any entity that is not 
registered in the group will not possess the group key and 
hence will not be able to communicate within the group. 
Fig. 1 provides a sequential flow that shows the phases and 
their relationship with the client and the controller. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. System design and activities 
C. Rekeying Procedure 
The rekeying procedure is a necessary part of group 
communications. Conventionally it is believed that the 
rekeying procedure is only required for post welcome and 
farewell of a client. However, researchers [10] have presented 
other scenarios where such a protocol may be required. The 
full list of scenarios is member addition, member deletion, 
mass join, mass leave, group division and group fusion. 
It is evident that in the absence of such a procedure, the 
entire group is at the mercy of the departing group member for 
not disclosing the key to an entity outside the group. The 
rekeying procedure is also important for giving admission to 
an entity that may wish to join the group in communications. 
When designing the rekeying protocol we propose adherence 
to the same scheme with slight sequential modification. By 
following the same scheme the source code can be designed 
by using modular functions which can be called according to 
the need of the algorithm. The rekeying procedure is based on 
the same protocol but with slight sequence modifications. Fig. 
2 shows the sequence of events required for the rekeying 
procedure in a group setting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The rekeying procedural steps 
V. SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
It is standard practice to simulate and evaluate a newly 
designed protocol to prove its efficiency. To do so, the key 
exchange protocol was simulated in C++ and MAPLE on a 3rd 
Generation Core i5 system with 6GB RAM. It was discovered 
that the conventional data types did not offer sufficient 
length/size to deal with numbers on the scale of 20 digits. 
Therefore the unsigned long long data type has been used for 
this purpose. 
Two separate user defined functions were designed for the 
encryption and decryption process. This enables the reuse of 
code, since the encryption and decryption is being done twice 
in the entire process. The outputs at each step have been fully 
traced and verified for correctness. Since there are steps in the 
process that may encounter communication delay or a simple 
delayed response. These times have not been simulated, since 
they are dependent upon a variety of other factors (network 
delay, propagation delay, system delay), which cannot be 
produced in a simulation environment. 
Check and authenticate the presence 
of all clients by sending an 
encrypted Turing test 
Controller discards previous keys 
and order clients to initiate keying 
procedure 
Each client generates a new 
ICMetric number XOR with a 
random number (steps 1 and 2) 
Encrypt and send to group controller 
(step 3) 
Group controller decrypts and 
generates arbitrary number 
(steps 4 and 5) 
Group controller generates message 
and after encryption sends to 
individual group members (steps 6 
and 7) 
Each group member decrypts the 
received message and derives the 
new key (steps 8, 9) 
Member 
Group Controller 
Registration Leave / join 
Message 
generation 
Key Extraction 
Rekey 
Person to person protocols are just s
persons, however in group based communic
needs to be run for varying sized populati
has been simulated starting with a small gro
grows to a large size group of 200 members. 
In the first simulation, the entire protoco
study the time the protocol should take, if it
The results are shown in the graph in Fig.
moderate time of 200ms for a maximum g
clients 
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time required in the entire key generation. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Time (ms) taken for the clients to perform ste
population of 25-200 
Group size 
Group size 
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
 
Ti
m
e 
(m
s)
 
imulated for two 
ation the protocol 
ons. The protocol 
up size of 25 and 
l was simulated to 
 was all inclusive. 
 3 and indicate a 
roup size of 200 
 
tribution in client 
3 are important in 
 entire operation. 
y intensive and 
oup population of 
hese initial steps 
or portion of the 
 
ps 1 to 3 for client 
The message generation 
crucial and intensive operatio
composed of computations per
all participants. Then, the me
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protocols even though it has 
Most security protocols have 
small group sizes ranging fr
population size should not be
because the time difference bet
of the population is seen as 
presented a secure key t
communications. The operating
around 45 milliseconds, which
The authors have not projected
greater than 25 clients. 
Table 1 provides a sum
comparison with group size. It 
group size increases there is a 
for key generation and distribut
Table 1: Projected times 
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additional ICMetrics features. 
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 used for simulation purposes 
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insignificant. Rao et al have 
ransfer protocol for group 
 time for 25 group members is 
 in our case is 40 milliseconds. 
 the running time for group size 
mary of increase in time in 
is interesting to note that as the 
sharp increase in the time taken 
ion. 
for 100 and 200 participants 
(ms) for 
ticipants 
Time(ms) for 200 
participants 
70 210 
15 32 
esented a similar protocol that 
nications in grid environments. 
ction time of 410 milliseconds 
ents. Our protocol takes 210 
milliseconds for running the entire protocol. These 
comparisons prove that our proposed protocol is both secure 
and efficient. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Often group based security is seen as a large scale 
communication between many small groups of two clients. 
This notion is misguided, as it does not consider the 
complexities involved in the creation of a group. Whenever a 
group is formed, there has to be a group controller that can 
administer the individual group members. This paper presents 
a novel security protocol that provides first an authentication 
mechanism for group members and then it provides a group 
key generation and transfer technique based on ICMetrics. 
This proposed protocol is unique, because it produces a single 
group communication key that is generated through individual 
contributions from each client in the group. To make the 
protocol even more resilient, we have based the protocol on 
the use of ICMetrics. ICMetrics is a breakthrough in the area 
of system identification and security provision. ICMetrics 
promotes the use of a hardware/ software feature extraction 
that can be installed on every device and hence generate a 
single number that is different for each device. This number 
will typically vary significantly from device to device because 
every device has a unique environment/software/hardware 
profile. 
Our proposed protocol uses the generated ICMetric and 
performs a series of computations and communications 
between the clients and group controller to generate a single 
group key. Also presented in the paper is a group rekey 
protocol that is effective when clients are admitted or removed 
from the group. To prove the effectiveness of the protocol, it 
has been simulated for varying sized client population. To 
start with, the protocol has been studied for a small group of 
25 participants. Then the population of the group is increased 
with increments of 25 up to a maximum of 200 participants. 
Based on the simulated results, it can be safely said that the 
algorithm is fully scalable and is expected to perform well 
even for groups that exceed 200 clients. 
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